This normalisation is perhaps the most fundamental—and most troubling—revelation of all: that a new rule now governs international relations, namely the law of the strongest. Have we definitively entered a system—or a non-system—in which the leaders of the major powers reject multilateralism, refuse to be constrained by norms before which all states are meant to be equal, and conduct their foreign policy through bilateral relations based on pressure, threat and coercion? In such a context, beyond the moral or legal dimension, a major political problem arises, particularly for European governments, and it can be formulated in very simple terms: if you do not denounce this law of the strongest when it is practised by your allies, you will have no credibility in condemning it when it is practised by your adversaries—and, in the process, you will have stripped international law and the principle of multilateralism of their substance.

It is, moreover, this vision and this method that bring leaders such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin closer together rather than dividing them. In reality, this is part of a broader trend that extends beyond international relations alone. Indeed, there is a growing propensity towards authoritarian practices in the domestic politics of an increasing number of countries, including some Western states long regarded as benchmarks of democracy and the rule of law. The temptation to view pluralism and respect for institutions as obstacles to the exercise of power—won at the ballot box, yet exercised and consolidated in an increasingly authoritarian manner—the criminalisation of political oppositions deemed radical, as well as pressure exerted on the media, are no longer the preserve of states commonly—often rightly—described as authoritarian regimes⁹.

The conflict against Iran is therefore unfolding in such a context, alongside the economic dealings between D. Trump and V. Putin over the Russo‑Ukrainian conflict¹⁰, Israel’s repeated violations of the ceasefire in Gaza¹¹, and China’s military and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan¹². These are all signs that remind us of the central importance of strengthening international law and the principle of multilateralism.

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that international law does not only operate in matters of war and peace. It is also, and above all, the general legal framework governing climate and environmental protection, forced migration and cross-border displacement, the protection of populations in disaster situations, the right to survival and material dignity, and the protection of minority groups. That it is far from perfect—and at times ineffective, particularly when it comes to maintaining peace in the face of failings by powerful states—is beyond doubt. Its consolidation should inevitably be accompanied by a profound reflection on its necessary transformation and adaptation to the contemporary era, which is fundamentally different from the post-Second World War circumstances in which the UN and its Charter were born. This effort raises complex but essential questions, starting with the permanent member status and the accompanying right of veto, granted to the five victors of the war within the Security Council.

In the meantime, however, the imperfections of international law should not lead to its abandonment, for what would be the alternative? The German legal scholar Kai Ambos summarises it as follows: “Like all sources of law, international law is also, above all, a matter of limiting power. Without international law, the new absolute monarchs of the 21st century will act without rules or law. This will benefit no one¹³.”